Abstract

Excerpted From: Danielle S. Williams, Good Kids, M.A.A.D State: Effects of Georgia House Bill 462 and Keeping the Age of Criminal Responsibility for Gang-Related Crimes Under Eighteen, 103 Washington University Law Review 873 (2026) (232 Footnotes) (Full Document)

Despite decades of proposed legislation and cries for juvenile justice reform, Georgia cannot cross the finish line--it is one of only three U.S. states whose age of criminal responsibility remains seventeen. When an individual’s age equals or exceeds the age of criminal responsibility, the state treats them as an adult for the purpose of adjudicating criminal offenses. A creature of state law, legislation has historically varied on what constitutes a child, thereby extending juvenile court jurisdiction. But this variance has been settled with forty-seven states establishing the age of criminality as eighteen--or older. Even the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child considers a child to be under the age of eighteen. In Georgia, however, all seventeen-year-old offenders are automatically prosecuted in superior court as adults, denying them access to rehabilitative programs available in the juvenile court system. Georgia’s treatment of seventeen-year-old offenders raises the question: Why does Georgia remain an outlier in the face of opposing national and global sentiments?

In 2023, the most recent attempt to raise the age of criminality to eighteen, House Bill 462 (HB 462), or the “Raise the Age Act,” was overwhelmingly approved by Georgia’s House of Representatives 145 to 22. Amending Title 15 of the Georgia Official Code, the Act would have changed the jurisdiction of Georgia’s juvenile court to include children seventeen years of age, with specific exceptions for gang-related crimes, repeat offenders, and categories of serious offenses. However, the Senate Judiciary Committee failed to advance HB 462 out of committee in the 2023-2024 session. Lawmakers will likely reconsider it another term.

HB 462 failed by virtue of the disconnect between unelected stakeholders who support raising the age, such as judges and child welfare organizations, and the political branches. Law enforcement officers and prosecutors continually hinder reform, citing the high cost of expanding juvenile jurisdiction to thousands of seventeen-year-olds and fears of appearing too lenient on crime. In addition, the opposition’s narrative surrounding young delinquents often paints them as violent and morally depraved. Compounding these dynamics, the executive’s contemporary shift back to a “tough on crime” approach has introduced punitive measures into reform proposals, such as HB 462’s broad judicial waiver for gang activity. Yet these concerns are outdated, implicate racial disparities, and are out of line with the majority of states across the geographical and ideological spectrum. Georgia must embrace change.

This Note will focus on the merits of putting seventeen-year-olds under superior court jurisdiction and ultimately argue for original jurisdiction in juvenile delinquency court for seventeen-year-old youths without a judicial waiver for criminal gang activity. Part I will examine the origins and historical underpinnings of Georgia’s juvenile justice scheme. The historical account is not comprehensive, but it surveys important eras that affect reform today. Part II offers a comparative analysis with a neighboring state, North Carolina, pulling general lessons that illuminate Georgia’s status as a national outlier in their age of criminality. Part III argues for juvenile jurisdiction over criminal gang activity, addressing implications of HB 462 and opposing views that sustain Georgia’s current policies.

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Over the past fifty years, Georgia’s attempts to raise the age of criminality have faced significant political opposition, making inclusion of seventeen-year-olds under original juvenile court jurisdiction unattainable. This resistance has persisted despite similar laws being passed in forty-seven other states. Contributing factors include claims of burdensome cost and rhetoric by executive actors villainizing young offenders. Raising the age of criminality is the first step in a more significant paradigm shift in Georgia’s juvenile criminal justice system. To ensure a steady step, any proposed reform must exclude a judicial waiver for gang activity. Seventeen-year-olds are less culpable than adults. Therefore, proportional sentencing would place them under juvenile jurisdiction. This approach reduces recidivism, which generally reduces taxpayer costs and provides economic mobility for vulnerable communities. As lawmakers grapple with the future of juvenile justice reform, gang-affiliated youth need to be served with rehabilitative opportunities without the collateral consequences of adult prison. Only then will Georgia’s aims of the justice system be reached: stopping recidivism and protecting public safety.

J.D. Candidate, Washington University School of Law (2026); B.A., University of Georgia (2022).